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REVISING STATE USURY STATUTES IN LIGHT
OF A TIGHT MONEY MARKET
By JACK C. MERRIMAN* and JAMES J. HANKS, JR.**
The early laws had in view this object, to prevent the powerful
lender getting more from the needy borrower than - what? Six
per cent. ? No; there is nothing in nature that points to six per
cent., - from getting more than the fair value at the time. I
coincide with that entirely. I agree that if you could pass a law
which should not fix, but ascertain the market value of money
every day, that would be right. In early, simple times, the value
could be ascertained, nearly. But as business increased, the means
for ascertaining the rates failed. It was found at last that fixed
legal rates could not be adjusted to the real value of money. Can
it be done now?'
The law of usury is ancient. It is also statutory. Therefore, one
might doubt the need for further critical analysis of this established
area of the law. The fact is, however, that only sporadic attention has
been given to the law of usury, perhaps because it is not an everyday
problem for the general practitioner and comes before the courts only
at cyclical periods. Usury laws are somewhat like a ceiling over a long,
long corridor existing through time. The interest rates are the floor.
Since these rates are subject to the changes of the money market, the
floor of -the corridor is not level but stepped up and down. The ceiling,
however, is statutorily fixed in each state and so is generally level.
Thus, the height of the corridor at any given time is the difference
between permissible rates of interest, as set by the state legislatures,
and actual rates of interest, as determined from day-to-day in the money
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University of Iowa; Partner, Weinberg & Green, Baltimore, Maryland.
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market. In periods of "easy" money, borrowers and lenders, as they
move down the corridor through time, have sufficient "headroom" in
which to transact business; 'but during "tight" money times, the floor
of the corridor is stepped up and parties seeking loan money often
bump their heads against the ceiling.
The law of usury becomes significant when the scarcity of money
causes higher interest rates. Except ,in these periods of "tight money,"
usury statutes generally lie dormant on the books. When a tight market
arrives, however, usury statutes are dusted off, re-examined, and often
found lacking; a scramble among the legislatures of the states to repair,
modify, or overhaul the statutes where they threaten to stifle the free
course of commerce frequently ensues. In any case, the response of
state legislatures, which usually meet for only a few weeks each year,
lags far behind the vagaries and exigencies of the business world. The
experiences of recent months should indicate that a fundamental re-
appraisal of the purpose and operation of usury statutes may be long
overdue.
I. THE MONEY MARKET TODAY
The United States may at last be emerging from a tight money
period in which borrowers experienced greater difficulty in obtaining
money than at any other period of time since the 1920's.
A continuing surge in commercial and industrial loans at New
York City commercial ,banks,' evidenced 'by the ratio of outstanding
loans to deposits, has reflected the heavy demand for credit which has
been straining the nation's commercial banking system. Until late 1965,
a loan-deposit ratio of 55 per cent was considered to be "tight." Among
all major U.S. commercial banks, the loan-deposit ratio for the end of
1965 was 60.8 per cent ;3 during the third quarter of 1966, it rose to
70.1 per cent.4 At major New York commercial banks, the average
loan-deposit ratio at the end of 1965 was 69.7 per cent.5 By August,
1966, this ratio had risen to 77.0 per cent ;6 and at the largest of these
banks, the ratio hovered 'between 80 and 85 per cent.7 By February,
1967, the ratio for the major New York banks had only eased to
74.7 per cent.8
The daily average of net borrowed reserves for member banks of
the Federal Reserve System, normally a rough indicator of credit de-
mand and current monetary policy, exceeded $200 million in only four
2. This article discusses lending from the perspective of commercial banks. Other
important lenders, such as first borrowers, rely upon commercial banks, while still
others, such as insurance companies, are indirectly affected by the situation of the
commercial banks. Virtually all lenders, therefore, are subject to the operations and
effects discussed herein. For example, when interest rates from commercial banks
exceed 6 per cent, individuals and businesses borrow against the cash values of their
life insurance policies at a guaranteed 5 per cent, forcing their insurance carriers to
borrow at more than 6 per cent from the banks.
3. Computed from figures in 1967 Fzn. IRSFRVZ BULL. 108, 110.
4. Computed from figures in 1966 FED. R ASsva BULL. 1486, 1488.
5. Computed from figures in 1967 Fn. Rlsi.Rvz BULL. 108, 110.
6. Computed from figures in 1966 Fzn. RPxsRvz BULL. 1.l66, 1368.
7. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 9, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
8. Computed from figures in 1967 Fxu. RzSpRV5 BULL. 414, 416.
[VOL. XXVII
REVISING STATE USURY STATUTES
weeks in 1965, when a less restrictive monetary policy prevailed.9 In
the second and third quarters of 1966, net borrowed reserves for all
member banks continually reached a daily level in excess of $300
million."0
For five years, from 1960 until the end of 1965, another indicator
of the current situation in the money market, the rate available to a
bank's most credit-worthy customer, remained steady at 42 per cent.
Between late 1965 and August, 1966, the prime rate moved forward
four times to 6 per cent, the highest level which the prime had reached
since it first came into wide use in the 1930's. In January, 1967, how-
ever, the Chase Manhattan Bank touched off a ragged retreat by reduc-
ing its prime rate from 6 per cent to 5Y2 per cent. Other banks failed
to follow the leader's move with their usual alacrity. When they did
lower their rates, it was generally to 54 per cent at first and to 5Y2
per cent only after a delay of more than two months."
Whether events which have unfolded since the beginning of 1967
have initiated a sustained period of easier money, it is probably too
early to say.
The underlying causes for tight credit conditions in this country
are bound up, of course, in the current economic boom, now in its
seventh year, which represents the longest sustained period of pros-
perity in this country since the decade following World War I. Large-
scale government spending in the Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions, the tax incentives in the 1954 and 1962 Revenue Acts, and the
tax reduction in 1963 have probably been the major stimulants for
this economic growth. Increased personal income and rising corporate
profits have encouraged individuals and companies to undertake major
investment and expansion programs, creating the present needs for
money. As a result, the demand for capital rapidly closed in on the
supply. This capital shortage persisted despite the fact that many banks
generated additional cash inventory through sale of securities (even at
a loss' 2 ) and through issuing certificates of deposit at rates up to
5Y2 per cent.'8
9. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 5, 1966, p. 5, col. 2. Each Federal Reserve Member
Bank is required by law to maintain certain percentages of its time and demand
deposits on reserve. The exact figures are established by the Federal Reserve Board
within statutory limits. Federal Reserve Act § 19, 38 Stat. 270-71 (1913), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 461 (Supp. 1967). In order to meet these requirements, banks with a substantial per-
centage of their deposits on loan or otherwise invested will frequently borrow money
from other banks. "Net borrowed reserves," also know as "minus" or "negative"
reserves, represent the extent to which commercial banks have borrowed from other
Federal Reserve Member banks in order to meet their legal reserve requirements.
10. Computed from figures in 1966 F4n. tSgv BULL. 988; and 1967 FED.
RESRVE BULL. 90.
11. Many bankers stated that the loan demand at the time still justified a 6 per
cent rate and that they cut back on their primes only because Chase forced their
hands. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1967, p. 1, col. 6. Moreover, there is a widespread
suspicion that Chase may have acted less in response to then-prevailing market factors
than out of a desire to win favor with the Johnson Administration. Id. at p. 1, col. 6;
p. 16, col. 1. In addition, the authors have discovered that many Chase customers
who were prime borrowers at the 6 per cent rate were not permitted to borrow at
the 5y2 per cent rate.
12. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 9, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
13. The shortage of funds in the United States has inevitably affected nations
abroad. Although there is probably no likelihood of a repeat of the debacle of the
1967]
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Moreover, at a time when general economic growth has spurreddemand for lendable funds, the supply of money available has been
decreased not only by record-high levels of commercial and industrial
loans, but also by heavy government borrowing,'4 the sale of govern-
ment securities and obligations, 15 deferred payment by the government
of its bills,"8 accelerated tax collections,' 7 and the Participation Sales
Act of 1966.11
Current economic thinking seems to favor solving the demand-
supply dilemma by discouraging demand rather than by increasing the
supply.' In this context, government and private money managers
have undertaken a number of measures designed to ease the present
money situation.
In late 1965, the Federal Reserve Board boosted its rediscount
rate, the rate at which it lends its funds to member banks, from 4 per
cent to 4/ per cent, where it remained until April, 1967. Increasing
the rediscount rate makes money more expensive to member banks,
who, in turn, raise their own interest charges, the basis for which is
the prime rate.20 Wall Street observers acknowledge, however, that the
1930
's, there are threats to individual countries. In particular, a chronic lack of fundsin less than industrialized nations has historically kept interest rates high. However,
now that even economically advanced countries, such as the United States, are experi-
encing increased money charges, underdeveloped nations are having even greater diffi-
culty obtaining capital, at least until the other major banks lowered their prime rates.The Johnson Administration has officially encouraged U.S. companies toborrow abroad, which drives up interest rates in foreign nations still further. The
current high lending charges in the United States were in part responsible for thefailure in October, 1966, of the Intra Bank in Beirut, Lebanon, the largest centralbank in the Middle East. Intra Bank's chief depositors, Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti
oil sheiks, steadily withdrew their funds during the first three quarters of 1966, in
order to loan their money at higher rates in the United States. Finally, in October, arun on the bank precipitated its collapse and forced the Lebanese government todeclare a three-day holiday for all other banks in the country.
14. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1966, p. 11, col. 2.15. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 26, 1966, p. 4, col. 3.
16. Business Week, Aug. 13, 1966, p. 29.17. Tax Adjustment Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 38.18. 80 Stat. 164 (1966). Under this Act, private lenders are being offered par-ticipation in pools of government paper priced low enough to yield competitive returns.The Federal Government will pay the difference between the actual interest rates onthe loan and the market rates prevailing at the time of sale. This program will, ofcourse, draw funds from an already tight money supply. Money managers have
charged that this Act will, in effect, establish a floor under, rather than a roof over,
already record-high interest rates. See also Barron's, May 23, 1966, p. 3.19. In the face of a demand-supply dilemma, some sectors, principally the banks
and frequently the Federal Reserve Board, have favored "tight" money, that is, dis-
couraging demand for money by making it more expensive to borrow; other factions,principally political elements descended from the Populist movement, have favored
"easy" money, that is, increasing the money supply, generally by making it less ex-pensive to borrow and sometimes simply by printing more of it. Tight money advocates
oppose increasing the money supply because it contributes to inflation, at times wheninflation is usually a problem, and because it weakens and may eventually lead todevaluation of the dollar. Easy money adherents dislike making money more ex-pensive because it hits hardest the small businessman who is a poorer credit risk thanlarger businesses and who, therefore, will be less likely to be able to borrow money
when it is scarce.20. Administration officials have been apprehensive about the genuine effect ofprime rate increases during tight-money periods. The feeling in some Washington
circles seems to be that the banks, rather than trying to discourage borrowing in theface of increased demand for credit, have actually been trying to exact additionalprofits for the use of their funds. In August, 1966, when the First National City Bank
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prime rate increases in late 1965 and 1966 may have been largely in-
effective in mitigating the money squeeze.21
In addition, the Board has not hesitated to increase the percentage
of time deposits which banks must set aside in cash at their district
Federal Reserve Banks. In June, 1966, the Board boosted the reserve
requirements from 4 per cent to 5 per cent, and, in August, from 5
per cent to 6 per cent. These reserve funds are completely unavailable
to member 'banks for any lending purposes whatever. Removing them
from circulation reduces the supply of money, thereby increasing its
cost to member banks and thus to borrowers from the banks. The Fed
can also adjust the rates which member banks may pay on negotiable
certificates of deposit.22
The Federal Reserve has also been actively dealing in government
securities on the open market. By selling long- and short-term23 gov-
ernment bonds, the Fed can soak up large amounts of funds as buyers
draw on their accounts at member banks.24 Conversely, when the Fed
buys government obligations, it injects cash into the system.25
Congress also has acted to alleviate the present situation. More
flexible powers have been granted to federal supervisory agencies to
regulate savings rates paid by banks and savings and loan associations,
thus indirectly contributing to a leveling-off of loan interest rates.26
of New York precipitated an increase in the prime rate from 54 per cent to 6 per cent,
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler, stated that banks should simply refuse to
make loans when the funds are not unavailable. The banks, however, contend that as
a practical matter, it is exceedingly difficult to turn down prospective borrowers who
have been long time customers, and who might take their business elsewhere. There-
fore, it is more expedient in such a situation for all banks to raise their lending
charges in the hope of thereby discouraging some of these borrowers.
21. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 9, 1966, p. 12, col. 2.
22. Certificates of deposit, or CDs, are receipts for funds deposited in a bank for
a specified period. Negotiable certificates of deposit were introduced in 1961 to lure
back non-interest-bearing checking deposits which had been increasingly diverted into
short-term, interest-paying obligations. Banks generally sell CDs to large corpora-
tions who then draw on the deposits which the CDs represent. At present, the Federal
Reserve permits member banks to pay no more than 5y per cent on CDs in the amount
of more than $100,000.00. In their money-gathering efforts through CD sales, com-
mercial banks compete for funds, first, with commercial paper and, second, with finance
companies' IOU's. Recently, the rates of return available to investors in commercial
paper and finance company notes have crept above 5V per cent. Thus, huge amounts
of money, once available through certificates of deposit to commercial banks for busi-
ness loans, have been increasingly drawn away. The pinch on banks has encouraged
corporate borrowers to fill their short-term credit in the commercial paper market,
often with the banks' blessing.
23. Short-term (90-day) government bonds are more widely known as "Trea-
sury bills."
24. Dealers in government obligations will not reveal the names of their custo-
mers, but they can be reliably presumed to be insurance companies, large business
firms, and commercial banks.
25. In addition, the Federal Reserve Board exercises very effective "moral
suasion" over the credit policies of member banks. In particular, the Board has
authority to refuse to lend its funds to any member bank which it determines is
pursuing imprudent credit policies. 12 C.F.R. § 201.0(e). On September 1, 1966,
the Board sent a letter to member banks stating that future Federal Reserve loans
would depend in part upon efforts of individual banks to moderate the extension of
business credit. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release,
September 1, 1966, pp. 2-3. Later in the same month, Governor Brimmer disclosed
that the Board had recently decided against further raising the discount rate, and
would, for the present, rely on openly urging banks to restrain their loans to business
customers. In January, 1967, the Board in effect rescinded its September 1 letter.
26. Act of Sept. 21, 1966, 80 Stat. 823.
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The Eighty-Ninth Congress also withdrew some of the tax incentives
for major expansion by suspending the most rapid methods of accel-
erated depreciation 7 and the seven per cent investment tax credit for
18 months.28
The measure for reducing credit demand which has been most
widely espoused in the business and banking communities has been
drastic reduction in government spending. The Wall Street Journal
has stated that cutbacks in defense spending "would diminish if not
curb the present shortage of marketable funds."29 Other commentators
have urged reductions in subsidy and welfare programs, federally-
financed construction, Export-Import Bank loans, "and the whole
wasteful apparatus of Socialism known as the Great Society." 30
Money managers recognize, however, that there may be "some
conflict between the objective of limiting business investment through
restriction of bank credit and the aim of supplying sufficient money to
permit business volume to grow in line with expanding activity."3 "
Interest rates may, therefore, remain at relatively high levels; and
borrowers in desperate need of funds may continue to be willing to
pay premium prices for the use of money.
Thus, the money market is, as the discussion thus far suggests,
an intricate structure. Nevertheless, both government and private
sectors have devices available to them with which they can influence it.
These devices - such as the rediscount rate, activity in government
securities, and the prime rate - are of necessity instruments which are
designed to be employed with considerable precision. They can be
exercised on a day-by-day, or even minute-by-minute, basis; and their
effects can be measured out in fine degrees. Clearly, any device which
is not so precise, but which significantly affects the market - whether
by design or only as a collateral effect to some other policy or purpose
should be carefully scrutinized and evaluated.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF USURY
Although factors are at work which will increase the supply of
lendable funds, relatively high interest charges are likely to persist
unless ,the economy suddenly ceases to expand at its present rate. At
the same time, however, most of the 'states, through their usury laws,
forbid the payment of interest in excess of a prescribed rate. If the free
enterprise system and governmental "guiding" of this system drive in-
terest rates higher, is there a counter public policy or purpose which
demands that an absolute limit on interest rates retard the otherwise
normal operation of commerce?
27. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1508(b).
28. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1508 (a).
29. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 1966, p. 1, col. 5.
30. Editorial, Barron's, April 4, 1966, p. 1.
31. First National City Bank of New York, Monthly Economic Letter, Aug.,
1966, p. 92.
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A. The Genesis of Usury
Ancient laws concerning the exaction of interest for the use of
money reflect a strong public sentiment against usury. Although
Babylonian farmers frequently borrowed money to tide them over until
the next harvest,12 the Hammurabi Code limited interest on loans of
corn or silver. 33 The Bible frequently inveighed against usury,34 and
so strictly did the Medieval church adhere to these injunctions that
frequently the charging of any interest at all was prohibited. 5 The
Middle Ages embraced the Aristotelian notionm that money, as opposed
to land or chattels, was "contrary to natuie. '8 7 In 1179, the Third
Lateran Council declared that usury was condemned by both the Old
and New Testaments and that usurers would be excommunicated and
denied Christian burial.38
Nevertheless, by the early Thirteenth Century, usury was common
in channels of trade and commerce. Although Dante relegated usurers
to the seventh circle of Hell, 9 Pope Nicholas III threatened to excom-
municate an English archbishop who tried to renege on usurious inter-
est which he owed to certain Italian bankers.40 Florentine banking fam-
ilies, such a3 the Bardi, the Peruzzi, and the Frescobaldi, lent money
at blatantly usurious rates to rulers of Italian city-states and secured
their loans with monopoly grants in vital commodities and with rights
to coin money, gather taxes, and quartermaster armies."'
Finally, during the Reformation, leading religious leaders, such
as John Calvin, recognized that money did have an income-producing
capability and that it was proper, within limits, to charge fees for its
use. Calvin, often regarded as a father of capitalism, regarded rents,
profits, and interest as entirely normal unless abused. 2 Thus, the rise
of commerce forced modification of the ancient concepts of usury. The
recognition of the commercial convenience of credit and a reassessment
of the moral aspects of usury led to English statutes permitting interest
at controlled rates.48
Massachusetts, in 1661, was the first American colony to enact a
usury statute ;44 Maryland was second in 1692. 45 By the outbreak of
the Revolution, all of the colonies had usury laws patterned after the
English statutes. Although Eighteenth Century legislators approved
32. HIBRONER, THE QUEST FOR WEALTH 70 (1956).
33. DRIVim & MILs, THS BABYLONIAN LAWS: LEGAL COMMENTARY 173 (1956).
34. See, e.g., Exodus 22:25; Leviticus 25:36; Ezekiel 18:8; and Luke 6:35; but
see Deuteronomy 23:19-20.
35. HOMER, A HISTORY Olt INMT.ST RATEs 70 (1963).
36. ARIS OTU, PoLrrIcs 51 (Rackham ed. 1951).
37. CoLn, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 69 (1952).38. NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIc ANALYSIS OF USURY 19 (1957).
39. DANTE, DMNs COMEDY, Inferno: Canto VII.
40. CoLS, op. cit. supra note 37, at 82.
41. HILBRONER, op. cit. supra note 32, at 73. See also CHnYNnY, THn DAWN
OF A Nxw ERA 47-51 (1936).
42. COLn, op. cit. supra note 37, at 152.
43. 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) ; 13 Eliz. 1, c. 8 (1571) ; 12 Anne, c. 16 (1713).




the exaction of money for money's use, they provided stiff penalties for
excessively high charges.
England abolished its statutory limits on interest rates in 1854;4e
and, within a few years, Denmark, Spain, Holland, Norway, Sweden,
and Belgium did likewise. In 1867, Massachusetts repealed its usury
laws.4 Other states maintained but revised their usury statutes. In
1845, Maryland enacted a statute which provided for the enforcement
of usurious contracts to the full extent of the legal interest rate, 6 per
cent.49 This statute is representative of legislation in force in most
states today.5
Thus, from earliest times to the present, lending money for profit
has been the subject of control. Today, however, the early moral stigma
against charging interest for the use of money has largely disappeared.
Modern controls on usury survive primarily to protect the naive bor-
rower, 51 as reflected by the fact that the borrower in a usurious trans-
action is not particeps criminis"2 or in pari delicto"3 with the lender.
Furthermore, it is clear that the defense of usury is personal to the bor-
rower 54 and cannot be asserted in behalf of a general public interest.5
Finally, legislatures have not been reluctant to modify usury statutes
when such statutes impede the normal forces of commerce.5"
B. The Misguided Corporate Exception
In the period between the Jackson Administration and the Civil
War, the corporation became an increasingly popular form of doing
46. Usury Laws Repeal Act, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 90 (1854).
47. PALGRAVE, 2 DICTIONARY Ol POLITICAL ECONOMY 433-34 (1925).
48. LAWS OrP MASS. ch. 56, § 2 (1867).
49. LAWS oV MD. ch. 352 (1845) ; MD. CODS ANN. art. 49, § 4 (1964).
50. Maximum permissible rates of interest generally range from 6 per cent [see,
e.g., D4L. CODS ANN. tit. 6, § 2301 (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 3 (1954) ; VA.
CODS ANN. § 6.1-318 (Replacement vol. 1966)] to 12 per cent [see, e.g., CONN. GtN.
STAT. ANN. § 37-4 (1960) ; WASH. Rgv. CODS ANN. § 19.52.020 (1961)]. Rhode
Island, however, has a maximum interest rate of 30 per cent. R.I. GSN. LAWS ANN.
§ 6-26-2 (1956). In some states, the parties may agree to any rate of interest, provided
that they do so in writing. See CoLO. Rim. STAT. § 73-1-3 (1954); MS. RzV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 228 (1964) ; N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. ch. 336, § 1 (1955).
51. First Nat'l Bank of Opp v. Cotton, 231 Ala. 288, 164 So. 371, 374 (1935):
"Usury laws are for the protection of the borrower against the cupidity of the lender."
52. National Amer. Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country Club, 16 Utah 2d 417, 403
P.2d 26, 30 (1965).
53. See, e.g., Plitt v. Kaufman, 188 Md. 606, 612, 53 A.2d 673, 676 (1947) ; Lloyd
v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198, 202 (1963).
54. See, e.g., Peterson v. Modjeska, 256 Iowa 152, 125 N.W.2d 751, 753 (1964);
Community Savings and Loan Association v. Fisher, 400 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966).
55. Cf. Sosin v. Richardson, 210 Cal. App. 2d 258, 266, 26 Cal. Rptr. 610, 614(1962).
56. In some states, for example, there is no limitation on the interest chargeable
on corporate bonds. See, e.g., N.C. GFN. STAT. § 24-2 (Replacement vol. 1965) ; O".
Rnv. CODS ANN. § 82.120(4) (1953). Also, some states exempt from the usury statutes
loans in excess of a certain amount which are secured by commercial paper. See, e.g.,
N.Y. GSN. OBL. LAW § 5-523 (1964) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 1 (1954). In addition,
usury laws are now being frequently evaded by means of excessive service charges, or
point, by sales with repurchase options, and by tie-in sales. Moreover, although
usury laws have historically been designed to protect small borrowers, they have now
been superseded in this area by consumer loan legislation. Cf. Uniform Small Loan
Law, MD. CODe ANN. art. 58A (Repl. vol. 1966). Thus, "the scope of general usury
statutes has been increasingly restricted to the area of commercial lending." Note, 65
YALE L.J. 105, 106 (1955).
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business ;57 and, in the rapidly expanding industrial economy of that era,
borrowers naturally were no longer only individuals, but larger and
larger business concerns. In 1850, New York, the nation's financial
hub, was casting about for a method which would emancipate legiti-
mate business borrowers from usury restrictions. The device chosen
by the state legislature was an amendment to the usury statutes which
precluded corporations from asserting usury as a defense to an action
on a loan.53 In effect, New York concluded that the borrowers least
likely to need the protection of usury statutes are corporations and that
borrowers most in need of this protection are not corporations, but
individuals. Several jurisdictions, including Maryland, 59 have emulated
New York with statutes which either preclude corporations from de-
fending on the ground of usury6" or which authorize corporations to
borrow at any mutually agreed upon rate."1 Here again, public policy
in limiting interest charges yielded to the convenience of commerce.
Once the corporate exception was statutorily enshrined, the natu-
ral inclination of lenders who wanted to charge interest in excess of
the statutory limit was to force the borrower to form a corporation in
order to furnish a corporate borrower. When such cases come before
the courts, the primary question, although not always so stated, is
whether the usury statute is being followed or evaded.6" In an early
New York case, Jenkins v. Moyse,63 the court decided that the bor-
rower's incorporation did not purposefully evade the statute but that,
indeed, the statute had been "followed meticulously in order to accom-
plish a result which all parties desire and which the law does not for-
bid." In Rabinowich v. Eliasburg,65 where a husband and a wife
created a corporation at the lender's insistence, the court upheld the
corporation as borrower even though the "object" of incorporation was
to enable the lender to charge interest "lawfully against a corporate
borrower capable of legally contracting such a liability."66 Such cases
as these are correctly decided only if it can be shown from the record
that the borrower was familiar with commercial and lending trans-
actions.
57. WILLIAMSON, THS GROWTH OP Ti AMERICAN ECONOMY 282-83 (1951).
58. LAWS ov N.Y. ch. 172, § 1 (1850); N.Y. GxN. OBL. LAW § 5-521 (1964).
59. MD. CODs ANN. art. 23, § 125 (1957).
60. See, e.g., D.C. COD tit. 29, § 904(h) (Supp. IV. 1965); PA. ANN. SAr.
tit. 41, § 2 (1954) ; VA. CODS ANN. tit. 6.1, § 327 (Rept. vol. 1966).
61. See, e.g., IND. STATr. § 19-12-101(c) (1964); Ttx. Bus. CORP. LAW art.
2.02A(9) (1956). For a discussion of the interpretation of corporate exceptions in
the courts, see Comment, 23 MD. L. Rsv. 51, 56 (1962).
62. Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern, 110 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654, 657 (1952).
63. 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521, 74 A.L.R. 205 (1930).
64. 172 N.E. at 522. See also Rosen v. Columbia Savings & Loan Ass'n, 29
Misc. 2d 329, 213 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1961). In that case, a partnership (composed of the
plaintiffs) conveyed land to a corporation for the purpose of borrowing to pay for the
land. The corporation borrowed the money, and then defendant re-financed this land
and made an additional loan to the corporate borrower. The corporation paid thelender a bonus which would have been usurious as to an individual borrower. The court
held that "it is fundamental that a corporation used for the sole purpose of borrowing
money at a rate of interest which would be usurious if an individual were the borrower
is nevertheless prohibited from raising the defense of usury." 213 N.Y.S.2d at 768.(Emphasis added.)
65. 159 Md. 655, 152 Atl. 437 (1930).
66. Id. at 660, 152 Atl. at 439.
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Requiring borrowers to incorporate in order to obtain a loan at
a rate exceeding the level set in the particular usury statute can obvi-
ously lead to abuses; it can injure those who most need the statute's
protection by qualifying them for the exception. The scheme became
so popular in New York that the state legislature enacted a statute re-
storing the defense of usury to a corporation which was established in
order for a home owner to obtain a mortgage loan.61 This amendment
was necessary to re-establish protection for borrowers in at least some
of the many transactions which met the literal requirements of the
exception but violated its purpose by forcing unknowledgeable bor-
rowers to incorporate.
C. Inadequacy of the Corporate Exception
Excepting corporations from the borrowers who may set up the
defense of usury does not adequately do the job. It is an inartful
attempt to provide that commercially knowledgeable borrowers cannot
plead usury to defeat a loan contract mutually agreed upon by equal
parties. On the one hand, a corporation may be no more than the alter
ego of a small borrower unfamiliar with general transactions in the
commercial marketplace. On the other hand, the exception for corpora-
tions is unrealistic in presuming that only corporations do not need the
protection afforded by the usury statutes. In today's commercial world,
there are many businesses operated as partnerships or proprietorships
which are every bit as familiar with commercial and borrowing trans-
actions as any corporation.
There is, however, no exception in the typical usury statute for a
partnership or for any form of business other than the corporate form.
Although the corporation may once have been the form in which most
commerce was transacted, its hegemony in the business world has
steadily faded. Today, certain statutes forbid some types of businesses
from incorporating; tax laws have encouraged many to do business in
the partnership form; and insurance is available to limit liability in a
partnership to the same extent that liability is limited in a corporation.
At the heart of commercial intercourse, investment banking and
securities brokerage houses are familiar with every nuance of debt
financing. Furthermore, they represent large and prime borrowers
from commercial banks. Yet, many investment banking houses are not
incorporated. Until recently, 1953, as members of the New York Stock
Exchange, they were not allowed to do business in corporate form.
They would, therefore, not qualify for the corporate exception in the
typical usury statute, although unquestionably such businesses do not
need the protection of such statutes. In the present money market, with
rates sometimes exceeding those prescribed in the usury statutes, a
lender must either refuse to lend to such businesses, resort to compen-
sating balances, or run the risk of whatever sanctions the particular
statute prescribes for a usurious loan.
67. N.Y. G4N. OBL. LAW § 5-521(2) (1964). See also Ky. Rzv. STAT. § 360.025(1962).
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Just as the federal income tax laws have a marked effect upon the
economy and an important role in causing the present tight money sit-
uation, they also have a significant effect upon the form in which busi-
ness is conducted. Tax laws encourage the use in certain industries of
business forms other than the corporate form."8
Much of the business of real estate development and real estate
improvement, which is heavily dependent upon financing from commer-
cial banks and insurance companies, is carried on in partnerships andjoint ventures.69 The increased preference in the real estate field for
the partnership form of business rather than the corporate is based
upon the tax treatment of three major characteristics of the real estate
business: (1) depreciation; (2) gain from sale of capital assets; and
(3) refinancing of appreciation in value.
An increasingly popular tax shelter for large investors, particu-
larly those in high personal income tax brackets, is the purchase or
construction, mainly with 'borrowed funds,"0 of depreciable real estate
improvements. The rent income from such improvements is largely
offset by depreciation taken on an accelerated basis, together with in-
terest on the loan and taxes on the property. For many years, the in-
vestor, 'if he has not incorporated the project, can receive cash flow
which is offset either entirely or in large measure by deductible items
and, most importantly, by the non-cash deduction for depreciation. At
the end of this period, if the depreciation does not shelter the rent in-
come, the property is often sold and any gain realized therefrom is
treated as long-term capital gain. 71 Whatever the legislative wisdom
of the depreciation tax shelter, it does provide a great inducement for
such investors to use a partnership, joint venture, or sole proprietorship
rather than the corporate form of doing business.
In some instances, when the depreciation deductions have decreased(e.g., under the double-declining-balance method of depreciation) to
the point where the rent income is not offset, the existing mortgage
on the property has 'been substantially amortized. In a normal mort-
gage market, refinancing is available. If the refinancing is done while
68. For example, the Internal Revenue Code permits utilization of depreciation
losses to individual partners or proprietors outside of their business entity and in their
personal tax brackets, but does not permit such utilization by individual stockholders
of a corporation. The Internal Revenue Code further discourages abuse of the cor-
porate form through punitive Code sections such as INT. REv. COD OF 1954, §§ 531-35(taxing unreasonable accumulations of surplus by corporations) and §§ 541-45 (taxing
undistributed income of personal holding companies).
69. See generally, Westfall, Corporate Analogues in Partnership Taxation, 80
HARV. L. Riv. 765 (1967).
70. Losses, including depreciation losses, in, for example, the partnership form of
doing business cannot exceed the adjusted basis of the individual partner's capital
interest. INT. RZv. CODg or 1954, § 704(d). However, this basis is increased, to the
extent of a partner's proportionate share of partnership liabilities, where the partner
is liable for a proportionate share of loans to the partnership or where no partner is
liable for such loans. INT. RZV. CoDn OF 1954, § 752.
71. An important exception is represented by INT. Rgv. CODE or 1954, § 1250,
which was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1964 to check the use of the tax
shelter device. Under § 1250, a certain portion of the gain on sale, varying with the
length of the holding period of the property and improvements made to the property,




in the corporate form, the proceeds of the loan are locked in the cor-
poration and can be obtained by the stockholders only upon payment
of dividends or liquidation. Even then, because of the collapsible cor-
poration problem, the proceeds may be taxed not as long-term capital
gains but as ordinary income.72 If, on the other hand, refinancing is
done when the property is held and operated in the form of a partner-
ship, joint venture, or sole proprietorship, the refinancing mortgage
proceeds come through to the owners tax free.
Financing such unincorporated real estate businesses in a tight
money market where the going rate of interest exceeds the statutory
rate again presents the lender with a dilemma. Does he make a loan
risking the defense of usury, or does he refuse to make the loan? Of
course, the lender may solve the problem by requiring the borrower to
incorporate. But why should commercially knowledgeable businessmen
have to indulge in such a device? Why should a businessman have to
tailor the form of his business to the usury law when other salient
factors favor operation in another form?
It can no longer be assumed that most of the nation's commerce
is carried out in corporate form, that all who do business in corporate
form are knowledgeable, or that all who do business in non-corporate
form are so lacking in knowledge that they need to be protected by the
usury statutes. Certainly, it is illogical to conclude that a prospective
borrower who selects a non-corporate form of doing business for sound
business reasons nevertheless needs the protection of the usury statutes
and must be bound by a statutory level of interest in obtaining a loan.
III. THE NEED FOR REFORM
The present tight money market and increasingly high rates of
interest have now driven the available funds to the point where the
interest which must be charged by the lender violates many state usury
statutes. In most jurisdictions, valid loans can be made only to cor-
porate borrowers. In view of these factors, many state legislatures are
being urged to revise their usury laws at their next sessions. In most
cases, the legislatures are being asked only to increase the statutory
interest rate, for example, from 6 to 8 per cent.
A. Need for New Approach
There is an undeniable need for legislative revision of state usury
legislation. Merely raising the statutory rate for non-corporate borrow-
ers, however, will not solve the problems inherent in most of the pres-
72. A "collapsible" corporation is defined in the Internal Revenue Code as a
corporation whose stockholders formed or use it "principally" to produce property or
to purchase inventory with a view toward selling or exchanging their stock or causing
distribution before the corporation realizes "a substantial part of the taxable income to
be derived" from its property. INT. Rxv. COD or 1954, § 341(b) (1). Where a cor-
poration meets these tests, the gain to its stockholders on a redemption, sale or
exchange of stock is treated as ordinary income rather than as capital gain. INrT. Rzv.
COD9 OP 1954, § 341(a).
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ent usury statutes. First of all, an increased rate which a legislature
may adopt at its next session may be as unrealistic five years from now
as the currently popular 6 per cent or 7 per cent rates are today. Second,
whatever rate is set and however much it may be increased, it will apply
only to non-corporate borrowers, and the fiction and artificiality of the
corporate exception will continue.
There is no justification for discriminating against knowledgeable
non-corporate 'borrowers who desire to pay the higher interest rate, but
who, because only corporations are excepted from the operation of
usury statutes, cannot persuade 'lenders to make the loan. Nor is there
any justification for allowing a knowledgeable businessman who has
been able to obtain a loan at today's going rates to assert a defense of
usury in a suit on the loan merely because he is doing business in non-
corporate form.
Legislatures should not merely patch up existing laws, but should
take the present opportunity to completely revise usury statutes to con-
form to the following criteria:
(1) Usury statutes should be uniform among the states.7 3
(2) The defense of usury should not be available to borrowers
who are conversant with general commercial transactions.
(3) The defense of usury should be available to borrowers who
are not conversant with general commercial transactions.
(4) Limitations on chargeable interest should be flexible so that
they can reflect the changing interest rates resulting from
supply and demand interactions.
B. Proposed Model Statute
While the need for re-examination of the entire field of lending
and finance legislation is obvious, the unhappy memories of the recent
tight money market indicate that the most pressing problem today is
to insure that businessmen are not arbitrarily restricted by state usury
legislation in their efforts to acquire funds for business purposes.
Nevertheless, any proposal in this area must be viewed and evaluated
in the framework of a general usury statute. Moreover, even borrowers
and lenders of funds for non-business purposes should be permitted a
certain amount of independence in negotiating a rate of interest which
will take into account the current state of the market, rather than a rate
which is arbitrarily limited by statute. With these considerations and
73. Uniformity is necessary to facilitate an "increasing nationalization of com-
merce" in which many business transactions affect parties and interests in more than
one state. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). Under one
view, a contract to which the defense of usury is asserted will be upheld if it would be
valid under the laws of any state with which it has "a substantial relationship."
RESTAXM'EN (SEcoND), CONPLICr OF LAWS § 334(d) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).In a tight money market, non-uniformity in usury statutes encourages a borrower to
shop for a loan having a situs in the state with the more liberal usury statute. On the
other hand, this situation discourages loans by lending institutions in those states
having stricter usury statutes.
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the criteria outlined above in mind, the following model statute is
proposed:
A. General Rule
(1) In all contracts made within this state and not governed
by , it shall be lawful for the parties
to agree that there shall be paid, charged, and/or received,
for money loaned to or in any manner due and owing from
any person, interest at an annual rate not exceeding six per
cent, or two times the Federal Reserve Rediscount Rate in
effect at the time such contract is made in the Federal Reserve
district in which the principal place of business of the lender
is located, whichever is greater.7 5
(2) It shall be unlawful for the parties to agree, in any such
contract, that interest shall be paid, charged, and/or received
in excess of that specified in paragraph (1) hereof, except as
provided in subsection B.
B. Business Loans
In all written contracts involving loans of not less than
$10,000.00 made within this state and not governed by
,76 it shall be lawful for the parties to
agree to pay, charge, and/or receive any rate or amount of
interest for money loaned to any person solely for the purpose
of carrying on a business in which he shall be then engaged
or for the purpose of acquiring a business in which he shall
immediately upon acquisition become engaged, provided that
such written contract shall separately state and clearly desig-
nate all charges for interest.
C. Definitions
As used in this section, the following terms shall have
the following meanings:
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, a corporation, a
business association, a co-partnership, a limited partnership,
a joint venture, a trust, an estate, a partner, trustee or execu-
tor thereof, or any combination of the foregoing.
(2) "Interest" shall mean the total amount of money and
the fair value of property and services paid, conveyed, or per-
74. Here list statutes applicable to specific transactions such as small loans, retailinstallment sales, etc. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are presently con-
sidering a uniform retail installment sales act.
75. Six per cent and two times the Federal Reserve Rediscount Rate, which wouldpresently amount to 8 per cent, are figures which are fairly representative of present
statutory rates. Perhaps slightly different figures are more appropriate. In any case,
the most important consideration is that the two figures be uniform from state to state.Coordination in establishing uniform figures could be facilitated through a group such
as the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
76. Here re-list the statutes listed in A(l), note 74 supra.
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formed or to be paid, conveyed, or performed, as considera-
tion or compensation for the loan of money whether stated
as a percentage of the loan, a percentage of the balances of
the loan outstanding, or otherwise.
(3) "Rate" shall mean a percentage of the principal amount
of the loan from time to time outstanding and unpaid.77
(4) "Federal Reserve Rediscount Rate" shall mean the rate
which the Federal Reserve district bank for the district in
which the principal place of business of the lender is located
charges for loans which it makes to its member banks.
(5) "Business" shall mean any transaction or transactions
in which a person is regularly engaged, or upon such person's
acquisition thereof will be regularly engaged, for the produc-
tion of income.
The model statute abandons any distinction between corporate and
non-corporate borrowers. Instead, it distinguishes between "business"
and "non-business" borrowers based on the premise that a borrower of
funds for business purposes is, or should be, generally familiar with
the fundamental commercial transactions, such as borrowing money,
which are part of engaging in business. 78 Basically, as the discussion
of the corporate exception points out, there is really no reason why
someone should not be able to borrow money in the course of business
at any rate of interest which he feels the state of his business will per-
mit him to pay.
Borrowing money, like purchasing raw materials, acquiring office
or factory space, or hiring and paying employees, is just one of
many transactions which someone must expect to encounter in the
course of carrying on a business for profit. While a business bor-
rower of particularly poor judgment might well agree to repay a loan
at a rate of interest which his business cannot afford, such a busi-
nessman might also purchase inferior materials, sign a particularly dis-
advantageous lease, or employ dishonest employees. All of these trans-
actions necessarily involve matters of business judgment. In most cases,
successful businessmen will realistically assess the factors involved in
77. Obviously, any new statute in this area should specify the method by whichinterest will be calculated. The model statute adopts the "simple interest" method of
calculation, which most clearly discloses to the borrower the price which he will bepaying for the borrowed money. Under this method, the borrower is charged interest
only on the unpaid balance of the principal. Thus, he pays interest for the borrowed
money only as long as he has its use.
Some states, however, statutorily authorize the "flat interest" method of
calculation. See, e.g., MD. CODs ANN. art. 49, § 1A (1957); MISS. CODE ANN. art. 4A,§ 5590 (Supp. 1964). Under this method, the interest on the entire principal is com-puted in advance for the complete period of the loan, then added to the principal, and
the total of principal and interest is divided by the number of payments to be madein order to reach the amount of each payment. Thus, a borrower at a stated rate of
6 per cent may end up paying almost 12 per cent.
Wisconsin provides by statute one rate of interest, 6 per cent, when interestis computed by the "simple" method, and another rate, 12 per cent, when it is com-puted by the "flat" method. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 115.05(1) (Supp. 1967).
78. See Note. 30 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 126, 132 (1955).
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each transaction, especially those involving borrowing substantial
amounts of money. There is no reason to take from these successful
and knowledgeable businessmen the unlimited right to obtain money,
even at high rates of interest, merely in order to protect businessmen
who are probably making poor business decisions in other contexts as
well. Furthermore, it is reasonable to presume that an interest rate
which a knowledgeable business borrower agrees to pay has been fairly
negotiated between equal parties in the same manner as a businessman
negotiates other contractual provisions.
Perhaps the ideal manner of determining whether to apply the
protection of a usury statute would be to distinguish between borrowers
who knew and understood the consequences of what they were doing
at the time of the loan and those who did not. Unfortunately, a true
distinction between "knowledgeable" and "unknowledgeable" borrow-
ers is probably unworkable. Even if the courts were able to deal with
such an elusive standard after a borrower had agreed to and then
defaulted on a loan, it would be almost impossible for a prospective
lender, before the loan is transacted, to be certain whether his borrower
"knows" what he is doing or not. The number of factors which would
be involved -in such a determination are virtually innumerable.
A distinction between loans for business purposes and loans for
non-business purposes, however, establishes a substantially ascertainable
standard, one which is adopted by the new Illinois usury statute.7 To be
sure, knowledgeable individual borrowers will still borrow some money
for non-business purposes, and will, therefore, under the model statute,
be protected and afforded the defense of usury. By the same token, some
business loans may involve unsophisticated borrowers. In this respect,
however, the minimum loan provision of $10,000.00 will protect many
such borrowers. Small loan laws in most jurisdictions give additional
protection. In the final analysis, the model proceeds on the sound prop-
osition that a businessman should not be allowed to negate his contract
to pay an agreed upon and clearly stated rate of interest any more than
he should be allowed to rescind any other of the many contracts he must
frequently and regularly enter into in the course of his business.
In considering a statute which would protect the naive but not the
sophisticated borrower, one solution might appear to be a waiver pro-
vision. The present case law, permitting the borrower to incorporate
solely for the purpose of bringing the loan within the statute's corporate
exception, is based upon the borrower's exercising an option, and this
is essentially equivalent to a waiver. Nevertheless, it is clear that con-
tractual waivers are not recognized in the field of usury.8 The bor-
rower, by incorporating, may elect not to have the statute apply; or, by
voluntarily paying the usurious interest81 or by failing to plead usury
specifically, 2 he may waive the defense which the statute affords him.
79. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 74, § 4(c) (Supp. 1966).
80. See, e.g., Ostiguy v. A. F. Franke Constr., Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 350, 347 P.2d
1049, 1053, 81 A.L.R.2d 1271 (1959). See also 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1515, at
731 (1962).
81. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Walton, 72 Nev. 62, 294 P.2d 364, 365-66 (1956).
82. See, e.g., Ionic Petroleum, Ltd. v. Third Finance Corp., 411 P.2d 492, 497
(Okla. 1966).
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He may not, however, promise in advance that he will not raise the
defense of usury. Allowing such a contractual waiver in the case of
the naive borrower would eliminate the statute's protection where it
is most needed. If the law must protect the unknowledgeable borrower
from 'his contract to pay usurious interest, it must also protect him
against a contract waiving his defense against performing his original
contract. On the other hand, there is no justification for paternalistically
protecting a knowledgeable borrower or even allowing him the choice
through election or waiver of being able to negate 'his contract to pay
the interest mutually agreed upon.
In addition, the model statute provides a flexible interest rate for
non-business loans. Flexibility could also be realized by establishing
a less objective standard than the fixed percentage rates commonly
employed in today's usury statutes. By the Moneylenders Act of 1900,83
for example, England, not having a usury statute as such, empowered
the equity courts to set aside interest charges which were "excessive"
or loan transactions which were "harsh and unconscionable."84 Obvi-
ously, this has led to judging each case "by its particular facts," 5 so
that lenders act at their peril or at least without sufficient objective
standards for them to know in advance of litigation whether their loans
are valid.86 The model statute is designed to provide for flexibility
without sacrificing the certainty which lenders need.
83. 63 & 64 Vict. c. 51.
84. Id. at § 1 (1).
85. Blair v. Buckworth, 24 T.L.R. 474 (C.A. 1908).
86. In Blair v. Buckworth, 24 T.L.R. 474 (C.A. 1908), the court concluded that
the lender "took advantage" of the borrower by exacting a 6 per cent rate of interest.
Id. at 476. However, in Carrington's, Ltd. v. Smith, [1906] 1 K.B. 79, the court upheld
a loan of 150 at 75 per cent where the borrower had agreed to the lender's terms
"without ever intending to comply with them, but intending all along to set up ...
the Moneylenders Act and to try to get off on paying some small rate of interest,
knowing well that the plaintiff never would have made him the advance on such terms."
Id. at 82-83.
Although the courts concluded that no particular rate of interest was per se
excessive since Parliament had intentionally avoided a maximum rate of interest,
Carrington's, Ltd. v. Smith, [1906] 1 K.B. 79, 88, it soon became apparent that some
sort of upper limit had to be established. Accordingly, in 1927, Parliament passed a
second Moneylenders Act, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 21, which not only required moneylenders
to take out excise licenses, but also established a presumption that interest of more
than 48 per cent is "excessive" and renders the entire transaction "harsh and uncon-
scionable." Id. § 10-(1). Since then, the courts have held that it is for the lender to
prove that a rate of more than 48 per cent is reasonable. B. S. Lyle v. Pearson, [1941]
2 K.B. 391, 397. In Reading Trust, Ltd. v. Spero, [1930] 1 K.B. 492, the court upheld
a lender who proved that the borrower had sought funds to provide working capital
for a "speculative business," and had given no security, only promissory notes; that
two of the loans were for short terms, "when the rate of interest per annum is decep-
tive"; and that there was no evidence of any misrepresentations or undue pressure by
the lender, or of any weakness or lack of understanding by the borrower. Id. at 503-04.
However, the English courts have been especially ready to strike down loans
with inordinately high interest charges where the lender has not scrupulously adhered
to other provisions of the statute. See Edgware Trust Ltd. v. Lawrence, [1961] 1
W.L.R. 1354 (60 per cent); J. W. Grahame (English Financiers) Ltd. v. Ingram,
[1955] 1 W.L.R. 563 (80 per cent).
Thus, the problems which England has faced in interpreting the "harsh and
unconscionable" standdrd are similar to the problems which would be encountered in
attempting to delineate a distinction between "knowledgeable" and "unknowledgeable"
borrowers. In addition, it should be noted that the English courts have concluded that
the fact that the borrower "knew all about" the transaction into which he was entering
is only one element in considering "whether the transaction [is] harsh and uncon-
scionable." Blair v. Buckworth, 24 T.L.R. 474, 476 (C.A. 1908).
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Tying the maximum permissible interest rate for non-business
loans to the Federal Reserve rediscount rate will insure that, even in
a tight money situation, borrowers and lenders will be able to agree
upon a legal rate of interest without recourse to subterfuge. Providing
for the statutory rate to ride up and down with the rediscount rate
assumes, of course, some sort of nexus between the rediscount rate and
the money market itself. While there is not a demonstrably precise one-
to-one relationship, long experience has shown that the rediscount rate
responds to, and frequently initiates, changes in the money market.
Although each Federal Reserve district bank establishes its own re-
discount rate for member banks within its district, its decisions are
subject to the approval of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington,
which seeks to promote as much uniformity within the system as pos-
sible. Thus, the rediscount rates for all Federal Reserve districts have
been uniform almost 96 per cent of the time in the last 25 years.88
There is a good argument that if a statutory interest rate is to be
tied to some particular money rate, it should be the prime rate. To be
sure, the prime rate more faithfully reflects alterations in the money
market largely because it is such an integral factor in the market. How-
ever, each bank has in effect its own prime rate; and while in the past
the prime rates of almost all major banks have been the same, recent
months have shown that a "split" prime rate can persist for a substan-
tial period. Moreover, to tie a statutory interest limit to the prime rate
would permit the nation's largest lenders to establish their own limit
on the interest they charge.
IV. CONCLUSION
Now is the time to recognize that, in general, our usury laws are
archaic and badly in need of fundamental overhaul. The moral premises
on which they were originally based are no longer valid. They have
been patched and repatched time and again like an old quilt and then
shot through with exceptions whenever they threatened to inhibit com-
merce. They are inadequate in times of tight money and discriminatory
in their operation. They vary from state to state at a time when many
borrowers and many lenders are engaged in multi-state activity. With
legislatures throughout the nation considering amendments to their
usury statutes in light of the recent monetary situation, a timely oppor-
tunity is presented to furnish borrowers, lenders, and commerce in gen-
eral with enlightened, equitable, and modern usury legislation.
87. Federal Reserve Act § 14(d), 38 Stat. 265 (1913), 12 U.S.C.A. § 357 (1945).
88. Computed from figures in 1967 F4D. RSieRVt BULL. 399.
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